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ABSTRACT 
Eligibility assessments play an important role in Japan’s long-term care insurance program and 
have been designed so that municipalities do not have discretion in their working. However, 
there are doubts about eligibility assessments based on the municipal fiscal situation. This study 
empirically identifies the discretion of municipalities to undertake eligibility assessments 
employing the idea of opportunistic municipal behavior at amalgamation. Amalgamation offers 
municipalities an incentive to free ride (e.g., public debt accumulation) when they can 
subrogate the load to a new municipality after amalgamation. If so, pre-merger municipalities 
might increase the eligibility ratio before amalgamation. Difference-in-difference regression 
confirms a free-rider effect of pre-merger municipalities in the eligibility assessments for long-
term care by Japanese municipalities. Smaller pre-merger municipalities increase the eligibility 
ratio immediately before amalgamation. These results mean that the Japanese long-term care 
insurance system is not managed in accordance with the institutional design. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Rapid aging and weakened functioning of the family as primary caretaker of the elderly are 
common problems in developed countries. In Japan, the number of elderly people in 2010 was 
about 33 million, or 26.7% of the total population, rendering Japan one of the most aged 
countries. Against such a background, the Japanese long-term care insurance (LTCI) program 
was introduced in fiscal year (FY) 2000 to meet the needs of the increasing number of the 
elderly who need long-term care.  
LTCI is administered at the municipal level over a 3-year program management period 
based on the pay-as-you-go principle. The insurers (municipalities) have established special 
LTCI accounts for this purpose. Campbell and Ikegami (2000) and Mitchell et al. (2004) 
emphasize that the linkage between benefit expenditure and premium burden is an important 
innovation of Japan’s LTCI program. Residents aged 65 years and more (category I) and 40–
64 years (category II) are insured under the LTCI scheme. When an insured individual needs 
long-term care, the Certification Committee for Long-term Care Needs of a municipality makes 
an eligibility assessment by evaluating the person’s physical and mental condition necessitating 
care. If the number of eligible individuals and the amount of benefits in a period increase, the 
municipality increases the next period’s premium to balance the budget. Meanwhile, eligibility 
assessments are conducted by an objective evaluation based on the physical and mental care 
needs of individuals.  
Hayashi and Kazama (2008) find that municipalities facing financial difficulties control the 
eligibility assessments to balance the LTCI budget. The authors argue that the eligibility 
assessment could thereby function as a gatekeeper and constitute a powerful containment 
mechanism against increasing LTCI benefits. If the eligibility assessment process of the LTCI 
depends on the municipal fiscal ability, it is against the purpose of the LTCI to secure long-
term care as a universal service. Therefore, it is important to confirm the discretion of the 
municipality for eligibility assessment. This study confirms the discretion of the municipality 
for eligibility assessment employing the differencing method of Hayashi and Kazama (2008). 
In this study, I use municipal amalgamation in the Heisei era as the extrapolation shock of 
the eligibility assessment of LTCI. Recently, some studies have applied the idea of free-rider 
behavior of pre-merger municipalities. Amalgamation offers municipalities an incentive to 
accumulate public debt before amalgamation because the new municipality after amalgamation 
subrogates the load. Hinnerich (2009) and Jordahl and Liang (2010) find that smaller local 
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governments tend to accumulate public debt to free ride on the increased number of taxpayers 
in the new, expanded municipal entity. There is the typical common-pool problem first explored 
by Tullock (1959) and Buchanan and Tullock (1962). While Hinnerich (2009) focuses on the 
1969–1974 boundary reform in Sweden, Jordahl and Liang (2010) explore the country’s first 
wave of boundary reform in 1952. These studies use difference-in-difference (DID) estimation 
to clarify municipalities’ free-rider behavior before amalgamation. Employing the same 
estimation method, Saarimaa and Tukiainen (2015) investigate the case in Finland case and 
point out that the pre-merger municipality’s free-rider incentive should be low under voluntary 
amalgamation because excessive free-rider behavior might exclude that participant from the 
amalgamation. In addition, Nakazawa (2016) confirms this hypothesis in the case of Japan. 
On amalgamation, the eligible individuals of the pre-merger municipality before 
amalgamation are moved to the post-amalgamation municipality. Thus, if eligibility 
assessments could be conducted arbitrarily, the municipality would be likely to increase the 
number of eligible individuals immediately before amalgamation considering that the load 
would be borne by the larger entity after amalgamation. Therefore, this study examines the 
discretion of municipalities with regard to eligibility assessment by examining the free-rider 
behavior of pre-merger municipalities. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the institutional 
background of the local LTCI system and municipal amalgamation in Japan. The empirical 
methodology is presented and data described in Section 3. Section 4 presents the estimation 
results and discusses the main findings. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2 Background 
 
2.1 The LTCI system in Japan 
 
LTCI was introduced for the elderly in FY 2000 to solve the long-term care problem in 
Japan. The insurers (municipalities) have established special LTCI accounts for a 3-year 
program management period to administer the system. The municipalities estimate the total 
benefits for the next period and maintain a constant ratio of the total insurance benefits provided 
to the category I insured (aged 65 years and over). Therefore, the category I premium is linked 
to the benefit level. Surpluses, if any, are transferred to the Long-Term Care Benefit Fund 
(LTCBF) against future deficits. When fiscal resources for a certain program management 
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period are insufficient because of increasing benefits or decreasing revenue (owing to, e.g., 
forecast error regarding increase in the number of eligible individuals or failure in premium 
setting), the municipality could draw down the LTCBF or borrow from the Fiscal Stabilization 
Fund (FSF). However, to repay the FSF loan, the municipality would need to increase the 
premium for the next program period. Moreover, using the general budget to fund a 
municipality’s LTCI special account is prohibited by law, beyond its entitlement of 12.5% of 
the LTCI benefits.1 
Insured categories I and II can be grouped according to the nature of care required by the 
process of eligibility assessments. Conditions requiring care range from mild to serious in a 
multistep approach. The degree of eligibility ranges across six levels from “support need” (the 
lowest level) to “long-term care need V” (the highest level). The eligibility levels have been 
increased to seven since FY 2006 and the support need has been divided into two stages (I and 
II). Individuals eligible for support are not permitted to use some LTCI services (e.g., facility 
care services). The benefits are allocated based on points and are limited by the degree of 
eligibility. For example, the monthly benefit limits range from approximately 49,770 JPY (for 
support need I) to 358,300 JPY (for long-term care V).2 In addition, benefit limits are set for 
the utilization of facility services by facility type, according to the level of eligibility.3 The 
insured person should pay 10% of the care cost, while LTCI would cover the remaining 90%. 
By these institutional criteria, universal service use and horizontal equity vis-à-vis eligibility 
for LTCI benefits are guaranteed, irrespective of the insured individual’s income and place of 
residence. 
Eligibility assessments are performed in two stages. The first stage is a hearing on the 
physical and mental conditions of the person in need of long-term care. The person is asked a 
set of standardized questions, and the answers are evaluated mechanically by a judgment 
process. In addition, the person’s physician writes a comment based on a unified style. In the 
second stage, the Certification Committee for Long-term Care Needs, consisting of medical 
and welfare specialists, decides the level of eligibility based on the result at the first stage. Thus, 
the eligibility assessment process appears to be objective and uniform. However, Hayashi and 
Kazama (2008) argue that municipalities that face financial problems control eligibility 
                                                  
1 LTCI benefits are financed by premium revenue from category I and II insured (50%), the 
central government (25%), the prefectural government (12.5%), and the municipal 
government (12.5%). 
2 The data relate to the fifth program management period, from FY 2012 to FY 2014. 
3 Of course, an insured can purchase additional services above the limit at his or her own 
cost. 
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assessments to balance the LTCI budget. Their finding, if indeed correct, would undermine the 
very basis of the LTCI system. 
 
2.2 Municipal amalgamation in Japan 
 
The municipal amalgamation in Japan is roughly divided into three big waves. The first 
wave, from 1888 to 1889, reduced the number of municipalities from 71,314 to 15,820. The 
second wave lasted from 1953 to 1961, further reducing the number from 9,868 to 3,472. In 
the latest wave, between April 1999 and January 2012, the number almost halved from 3,229 
to 1,719. In 1965, the Japanese government enacted the Municipal Amalgamation Law (the old 
law, henceforth), which included several measures to promote amalgamation, such as 
guaranteeing the same inter-governmental subsidy (the local allocation tax grant, LAT)4 to the 
merged municipality for 10 years after amalgamation. However, although the old law was 
revised every 10 years until the 1990s, it did not provide for voluntary amalgamation, and the 
number of municipalities decreased by only 163 from 1965 to 1999. 
A remarkable change occurred in the latter half of the 1990s when the Japanese government 
reviewed the roles of the central, prefectural, and municipal governments. In 1999, the old law 
was amended to conform to the provisions of the Omnibus Law of Decentralization, and 
additional measures were included to provide financial support for municipal amalgamation. 
Many municipalities pursued amalgamation only until the end of FY 2005, because the 
financial support provided by the national government for amalgamation under the old law was 
revised in FY 2006 under the new law. The number of amalgamations in FY 2004 and FY 2005 
were 215 and 325, respectively. 
The old law provided several types of financial support for amalgamation. First, the LAT 
guarantee period was extended to 15 years after amalgamation. Second, the law allowed 
amalgamated municipalities to finance 95% of the amalgamation cost (e.g., for construction) 
by issuing special-purpose amalgamation bonds for 10 years after amalgamation. Moreover, 
the central government covered 70% of the principal and interest payments on the bonds 
through the LAT. These incentives induced many municipalities to undergo amalgamation. 
 
3 Empirical framework and data 
                                                  
4 The LAT is the inter-governmental subsidy intended to adjust the uneven distribution of 
central government resources between local governments. 
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3.1 Empirical framework 
 
Weingast et al. (1981) consider the incentive to free ride in a formal framework. At the 
efficient spending level, the marginal social cost of a public-spending project in a certain 
district equals the marginal social benefit. However, if the costs of the project must be shared 
among ݊ districts, only 1 ݊⁄  of the social marginal cost of the project should be loaded on a 
district.5 Therefore, when municipalities amalgamate, a small municipality tends to have a 
strong incentive to free ride. The social marginal borrowing cost of municipality ݅ is equal to 
௜ܰ ௝ܰ ൐ 1⁄ , where ௜ܰ  denotes the population of municipality ݅ , which participates in an 
amalgamation, and ௝ܰ  is the total population of the post-amalgamation municipality, 
including municipality ݅ . Hinnerich (2009) formulates the strength of municipality 	݅ ’s 
incentive to free ride as ܨݎ݁݁ݎ݅݀݁௜ ൌ 1 െ ௜ܰ ௝ܰ 	 ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ⁄ . Jordahl and Liang (2010) employ 
the same concept, which they refer to as the “law of 1 ݊⁄ .” 
This study employs Hinnerich’s (2009) definition of the free-rider incentive associated with 
amalgamation and applying eligibility assessments of the Japanese LTCI. Under the LTCI 
system, the elderly bear the LTCI premium burden. Therefore, in this study, I change ௜ܰ and 
௝ܰ from the total population to the elderly population and define the following relationship: 
 
ܧ݈ܾ݈݅݃݅݅݅ݐݕ௜ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚܨݎ݁݁ݎ݅݀݁௜ ൅ ݑ௜  (1) 
 
where ܧ݈ܾ݈݅݃݅݅݅ݐݕ௜  is the eligibility ratio, defined as the number of eligible individuals 
divided by the number of category I insured. The parameter β represents the free-rider effect, 
and ݑ௜ represents the observed or unobserved eligibility ratio determinates. Considering the 
difference of eq. (1), I can write the equation as 
 
∆ܧ݈ܾ݈݅݃݅݅݅ݐݕ௜ ൌ ߠ ൅ ߚ∆ܨݎ݁݁ݎ݅݀݁௜ ൅ ݒ௜ (2) 
 
where ∆ indicates the difference operator, representing the difference between the base fiscal 
year and the fiscal year before amalgamation. When the pre-merger municipality raises the 
eligibility ratio considerably before amalgamation, the municipality should owe the load. 
                                                  
5 Gilligan and Matsusaka (1995, 2001), Bradbury and Crain (2001), Baqir (2002), and 
Bradbury and Stephenson (2003) empirically analyze the 1 ݊⁄  effect. 
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Therefore, this study assumes that the pre-merger municipality raises the eligibility ratio the 
FY before amalgamation. Then, all ܨݎ݁݁ݎ݅݀݁ of pre-merger municipalities more than 1 FY 
before amalgamation equals zero. Since ∆ܨݎ݁݁ݎ݅݀݁ ൌ ܨݎ݁݁ݎ݅݀݁, eq. (2) can be written as 
follows: 
 
∆ܧ݈ܾ݈݅݃݅݅݅ݐݕ௜ ൌ ߠ ൅ ߚܨݎ݁݁ݎ݅݀݁௜ ൅ ݒ௜  (3) 
 
To address the issue of municipalities facing financial difficulties with controlling the 
assessments to balance the LTCI budget (raised by Hayashi and Kazama, 2008), I employ 
variables relating to the municipality’s LTCI finances. The first variable is the LTCBF balance 
per category I insured person, and the second is the amount of FSF loan per category I insured 
person. In addition, I employ the LTCI premium for the category I insured because the 
municipality might control eligibility assessments, considering the premium already high and 
therefore, difficult to raise any further. Thus, eq. (3) can be written as 
 
∆ܧ݈ܾ݈݅݃݅݅݅ݐݕ௜ ൌ ߠ ൅ ߚଵ∆ܨݎ݁݁ݎ݅݀݁௜ ൅ ߚଶܮܶܥܤܨ௜ ൅ ߚଷܨܵܨ௜ ൅ ߚସܮܣ ௜ܶ ൅ ߚହ݌ݎ݁݉݅ݑ݉௜ ൅ ݒ௜
  (4) 
 
where the fiscal condition of the LTCI is sound if LTCBF is high but is in poor shape if FSF is 
high. Therefore, the former is expected to have a positive and the latter a negative influence on 
the eligibility ratio change. The proportion of LTCI benefits financed from the municipality’s 
general budget is compensated for by LAT disbursements. Therefore, I employ LAT per capita 
as an index of dependency on LAT revenue. Moreover, the high LTCI premium of the period 
indicates the lack of capacity to raise the premium in the future. Therefore, the amount of LAT 
and LTCI premium are expected to have negative influences on the eligibility ratio change. 
 
3.2 Data 
 
As mentioned in Section 2, the LTCI system is administered over a 3-year program 
management period. Important components of the LTCI system (e.g., eligibility levels, benefit 
limits at each level, and income levels for premium reduction) are often significantly different 
between periods. Furthermore, the premium is revised when a new period begins. Therefore, 
amalgamation scenarios preferably should be compared within the same management period, 
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considering that DID regression requires at least one difference estimation. 
While both FY 2004 and FY 2005 amalgamations occurred in the second management 
period and were adequate for the selection of an appropriate treatment group, the former would 
require estimation of differences between FY2002 in the first management period and FY2003 
in the second management period. Furthermore, FY 2002 data of LTCBF and FSF loan are 
available only at the aggregated prefecture level.6 Therefore, FY 2004 amalgamations are not 
appropriate for regression analysis. For FY 2005, however, difference estimation is possible 
within the same management period, and municipality-level data are available. Then, I consider 
pre-merger municipalities that amalgamated in FY 2005 as the treatment group to test my 
hypothesis (i.e., a municipality that has opted to amalgamate would increase the number of 
eligible people immediately before amalgamation). Municipalities that have never merged 
form the control group. The treatment group comprises 798 municipalities and the control 
group 1,057 municipalities.7 
From the above discussion, ∆ܧ݈ܾ݈݅݃݅݅݅ݐݕ௜is the FY 2004 eligibility ratio minus the FY 2003 
ratio. The data for ܮܶܥܤܨ௜, ܨܵܨ௜, ܮܣ ௜ܶ, and ܲݎ݁݉݅ݑ݉௜ are captured from FY 2003. These 
variables are for FY 2003. Table 1 describes the summary statistics and their sources. 
 
[Table 1 around here] 
 
The average, minimum, and maximum eligibility ratios for FY 2003 are 14.95, 7.89, and 
30.07, respectively. The highest eligibility ratio for a municipality is approximately 30% (for 
category I insured). The average LTCI premium per month in the second management period 
is 3,160 JPY. The difference between the highest and lowest premiums across municipalities is 
4,157 JPY. 
 
4 Estimation results 
 
4.1 Parallel trend assumption 
 
This study must test the parallel trend assumption to justify using the DID method. Figure 
                                                  
6 The first management period is from FY 2000 to FY 2002, and the second from FY 2003 to 
FY 2005. 
7 The number of municipalities employed is lower than the total number of municipalities, 
because municipalities that jointly manage an LTCI system are excluded from this analysis. 
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1 shows the average change in eligibility ratio of the treatment and control municipalities. FY 
2000 data of the eligibility ratio are available only at the aggregated prefecture level. Therefore, 
I employ the data from FY 2002.  
 
[Figure 1 around here] 
 
The black line indicates the treatment group and the light gray line indicates the control 
group. Figure 1 shows a similar trend between the control and treatment groups. Thus, I carry 
out a two-sample mean comparison test on the average change in eligibility ratio for each group. 
The t-values for the treatment and control municipalities are 0.759, 0.139, and 2.591 for FY 
2001 to FY 2002, FY 2002 to FY 2003, and FY 2003 to FY 2004, respectively. The t-value is 
significantly different only from FY 2003 to FY 2004, that is, the fiscal year before 
amalgamation. The result suggests that my hypothesis is appropriate. 
 
4.2 Baseline result 
 
In this subsection, I show the regression results of eq. (4) as the baseline specification. The 
results of the baseline specification are shown in Table 2. 
 
[Table 2 around here] 
 
All estimated values of ܨݎ݁݁ݎ݅݀݁  are significantly positive. Therefore, smaller 
municipalities have an incentive to increase eligibility assessments before amalgamation and 
they did so. The point estimate of ܨݎ݁݁ݎ݅݀݁ in eq. (4) equals 0.134 and the average free-rider 
index is 0.29. Then, pre-merger municipalities increase the eligibility ratio about 0.04 
percentage points more on average than do municipalities that have never merged.  
 ܮܶܥܤܨ is significantly positive, which means municipalities have sufficient surplus of 
LTCI finances to increase the eligibility ratio. On the other hand, the estimation results of ܨܵܨ 
loan are negative but not significant. This is probably because the LTCI finances of most 
municipalities are in good shape in the period. The amount of LAT per capita is negative but 
not significant. Finally, the higher premium clearly shows a controlled increase in the eligibility 
ratio.  
These results show, as Hayashi and Kazama (2008) conclude, that municipalities have 
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discretion to control eligibility assessments according to their fiscal conditions. Moreover, with 
the free-rider incentive at amalgamation, smaller municipalities adopt the opportunistic 
behavior of increasing the eligibility ratio. These results are constant regardless of pre-
treatment control. 
 
4.3 Robustness check 
 
As discussed in Subsection 3.1, pre-merger municipalities should increase their eligibility 
ratios immediately before amalgamation because if they were to increase it considerably before 
the amalgamation date, the municipalities would owe the load themselves only. Therefore, pre-
merger municipalities that merged in the latter half of FY 2005 had lower free-rider incentives 
to increase their eligibility ratios from FY 2003 to FY 2004 than did municipalities that merged 
in the first half of FY 2005. In this subsection, I rerun the regression by dividing the pre-merger 
municipalities by the amalgamation date. I divide pre-merger municipalities that merged in the 
first half of FY 2005 (from April 1 to September 30) and merged in the latter half of FY 2005 
(from October 1 to March 31, 2006). The regression results are shown in Table 3. 
 
[Table 3 around here] 
 
The estimated values of ܨݎ݁݁ݎ݅݀݁  are significantly positive for the pre-merger 
municipalities that merged in the first half of FY 2005 and are not significant for the latter half 
of FY 2005. Moreover, the point estimate of ܨݎ݁݁ݎ݅݀݁ is 0.302, which is far higher than the 
result shown in Table 2. This result supports the timing of free-rider behavior in the increasing 
eligibility ratio. 
 
4.4 Degree-of-eligibility changes 
 
In the preceding regressions in this section, I use the total eligibility ratio. However, in this 
subsection, I change the eligibility ratio at each level. As described in Section 2, LTCI limits 
are set according to the level of eligibility. Figure 2 shows that in the second management 
period from FY 2003 to FY 2005, support limits are set according to the level of eligibility. 
 
[Figure 2 around here] 
11 
 
 
The difference in the limits of care benefits is greatest between support need and long-term 
care need I, that is, 104,300 JPY per month. Moreover, individuals eligible for support could 
not use facility services. The difference in the unit cost between at-home care and facility care 
is very large. The average unit cost is 3,400 JPY for at-home care and 33,645 JPY for facility 
care.8 Therefore, it is significant whether the insured are eligible for support or long-term care 
need I for the LTCI finances of the municipality. In this subsection, regressions are used to 
examine degree-of-eligibility changes in the pre-amalgamation municipality. 
For all levels of care need, the municipality decides simultaneously whether to increase the 
eligibility ratio. Thus, the decisions possibly influence each other, and the ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression cannot capture the unobserved relationship. Therefore, I employ 
simultaneous equation methods, such as seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models, to 
estimate a system of equations involving contemporaneous correlations between the errors of 
different equations for the same period. The coefficients of regression by SUR and OLS are 
equal because both equations use the same explanatory variables; however, the standard errors 
and significance are different. After estimating SUR, I check the hypothesis of independence 
of both equations using the Breusch–Pagan (BP) test. The regression results are shown in Table 
4. 
 
[Table 4 around here] 
 
The chi square of the BP test of independence is 209.610, which supports the use of SUR. 
The results show that the free-rider effect is positively significant for LTC needs I, II, and IV. 
Moreover, the point estimate of ܨݎ݁݁ݎ݅݀݁ in LTC need I is significant at the 1% level and is 
the highest value. Therefore, the pre-amalgamation municipality controls the eligibility ratio 
centering on LTC need I. From these results, pre-amalgamation municipalities seem to have 
upgraded the insured’s eligibility from Support need to LTC need I. 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
This study identifies the discretion of municipalities to undertake eligibility assessments for 
                                                  
8 These data were calculated from The Annual Report on LTCI Programs 2003, Ministry of 
Health, Labour and Welfare. 
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the LTCI program in Japan. Eligibility assessments for the Japanese LTCI program are 
conducted by an objective evaluation based on the physical and mental care needs of 
individuals. Under the assessments, universal services of long-term care are guaranteed. 
Therefore, the objectivity of LTC eligibility assessment is an important factor. However, 
Hayashi and Kazama (2008) point out that municipalities facing financial difficulties control 
eligibility assessments in order to balance the LTCI budget.  
Using the idea of free-rider behavior provided by Hinnerich (2009) and Jordahl and Liang 
(2010), this study explores free-rider behavior of pre-merger municipalities with regard to 
eligibility assessment. The results based on DID regression show that the smaller pre-merger 
municipalities increase their eligibility ratios in the fiscal year before amalgamation. Free-rider 
incentives are significantly positive for a change in the eligibility ratio. The amount saved in 
the LCTBF is significantly positive, and the LTCI premium of category I insured is 
significantly negative for a change in the eligibility ratio. Therefore, municipalities have 
discretion to set their eligibility ratios and to increase their ratios before amalgamation. 
Moreover, the SUR regression results show that pre-amalgamation municipalities upgraded the 
insured’s eligibility status from support need to LTC need I. 
This study demonstrates a common-pool problem in which the newly created municipality 
subrogates the increased load of eligible individuals covered by the municipality before 
amalgamation. Moreover, it is shown that the Japanese LTCI system is not managed in 
accordance with the institutional design. If this situation were to persist, municipalities with 
poor LTCI finances would face the possibility of an increase in the number of insured who are 
not eligible for cover. This is a serious threat to the horizontal equity of the LTCI system in 
Japan. 
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Table 1  
Summary statistics 
Variables N Mean S.D. Min Max 
Eligibility ratio in 2003 (%) 1855 14.95 2.84 7.89 30.07
Change in eligibility ratio (treatment) 798 0.65 0.81 -3.00 4.94
Change in eligibility ratio (control) 1057 0.56 0.69 -2.80 2.95
Free-ride 1855 0.29 0.38 0 0.99
LTCBF per category I-insured (1,000 
JPY) 
1855 9.24 8.49 0 52.05
FSF per category I-insured (1,000 JPY) 1855 0.17 0.87 0 10.05
LAT per capita (1,000 JPY) 1855 1.79 1.89 0 23.70
LTCI premium for category I-insured (1 
JPY) 
1855 3,159 561 1,785 5,942
Sources: Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, The Annual Report on LTCI Programs 2003 
and 2004, The Survey of the Long-term Care Facilities and Offices 2003, The Statistics Bureau, 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 
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Figure 1  
Average change in eligibility ratio (percentage point) 
 
 
 
0.400
0.500
0.600
0.700
0.800
0.900
1.000
1.100
1.200
1.300
1.400
FY 2001 to 2002 FY 2002 to 2003 FY 2003 to 2004
Treatment Control
16 
 
Table 2 
Free-rider effect of smaller municipalities before amalgamation 
 Estimation 1 Estimation 2 Estimation 3 
Free-ride  0.120** (0.051) 0.132*** (0.051) 0.134*** (0.051) 
LTCBF  0.012*** (0.002) 0.005** (0.003) 
FSF loan  -0.013 (0.023) -0.002 (0.024) 
LAT  -0.021 (0.013) 
Premium  -0.000*** (0.000) 
Constant 0.565*** (0.020) 0.452*** (0.031) 1.280*** (0.138) 
N 1855 1855 1855 
R2 0.004 0.024 0.053 
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, 
respectively. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
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Table 3  
Sample divided by date of amalgamation 
 
First half of FY 2005 
From April 1 to September 30
Latter half of FY 2005 
From October 1 to March 31 
Free-ride  0.302*** (0.076) 0.058 (0.059) 
LTCBF 0.005* (0.003) 0.006** (0.003) 
FSF loan -0.000 (0.029) -0.004 (0.026) 
LAT -0.000 (0.014) -0.023 (0.015) 
Premium -0.000*** (0.000) -0.000*** (0.000) 
Constant 1.073*** (0.163) 1.254*** (0.146) 
N 1304 1608 
R2 0.049 0.051 
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, 
respectively. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
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Figure 2  
Support limits according to level of eligibility in second management period 
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Table 4  
Free-rider effect by degree of eligibility levels 
 
Support 
need  
LTC need 
I 
LTC need 
II 
LTC need 
III 
LTC need 
IV 
LTC need 
V 
Free-ride  
-0.009  
(0.038) 
0.124*** 
(0.048) 
0.088**
(0.034) 
0.003 
(0.029) 
0.058** 
(0.027) 
0.037 
(0.024) 
LTCBF 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.012  
(0.002) 
0.002
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
FSF loan 
0.003 
(0.013) 
0.030* 
(0.018) 
-0.043*** 
(0.012) 
-0.000 
(0.010) 
0,022** 
(0.010) 
-0.012 
(0.009) 
LAT 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
-0.018**
(0.007) 
0.009*  
(0.005) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
-0.011** 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
Premium 
0.000*
(0.000) 
-0.000***
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
Constant 
0.067 
(0.083) 
0.651***  
(0.105) 
0.079 
(0.074) 
0.138**
(0.063) 
0.125*
(0.059) 
0.018 
(0.052) 
N 1304 1304 1304 1304 1304 1304 
R2 0.003 0.037 0.026 0.000 0.016 0.003 
 Breusch–Pagan test  209.61*** 
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels, 
respectively. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
 
